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Judicialization in International Security  
A Theoretical Concept and some Preliminary Evidence 
ABSTRACT 
Many claim a process of judicialization of international dispute settlement procedures is 
taking place. In order to capture this ongoing process we introduce an analytical frame-
work to assess the degree of judicialization of international dispute settlement proce-
dures. We then proceed to present preliminary results of applying this framework to the 
procedure and practice of dispute settlement in the United Nations Security Council.  
In our concept, judicialization means that international dispute settlement procedures 
increasingly incorporate the normative principle of impartiality, i.e. the principle of a 
comparable treatment of comparable breaches of law. We use a graded scale ranging 
from purely diplomatic to predominantly judicial procedures to assess the degree of 
judicialization of any given dispute settlement procedure. From our institutionalist point 
of view, it is entirely an empirical question whether – and if so when – judicialized 
dispute settlement procedures lead to a corresponding practice of judicialized dispute 
settlement. For this reason we analyze in a second step the corresponding practice of 
dispute settlement. The degree of judicialization of the dispute settlement procedure 
within the framework of the United Nations Security Council remains low. Nonetheless, 
our comparison of the periods 1974-1983 and 1990-1999 suggests so far an increasing 
judicialization of the dispute settlement practice within the Security Council. 
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Judicialization in International Security  
A Theoretical Concept and some Preliminary Evidence 
INTRODUCTION1 
Since the 17th century the rule of law has emerged as the dominant legal principle within 
modern states, while between modern states sovereignty has become the central legal 
principle. The former reflects the domestic hierarchy of the state over its society, while 
the latter institutionalizes anarchy within the international society of states. As 
principles, however, the rule of law and sovereignty could hardly be more contradictory. 
While the rule of law requires states to respect domestic law, sovereignty gives states 
the justification to act arbitrarily at their own discretion beyond international law. 
Legally, both principles are fundamental to the identity of modern states. If, therefore, a 
substantial international rule of law were to emerge to complement the domestic rule of 
law and hollow out sovereignty, this would amount not to a minor modification, but to a 
fundamental transformation of the modern state.2 
In order to establish whether this transformation is taking place, we will discuss 
whether issue area-specific international judiciaries, in a similar way to domestic 
judiciaries, constitute the institutional backbone of a potentially emergent international 
rule of law. After all, a process of judicialization of international procedures designed to 
settle disputes about breaches of international law is taking place (Romano 1999; 
Keohane et al. 2000). The diplomatic dispute settlement procedures of GATT, for 
instance, have been replaced by a judicial dispute settlement mechanism under the 
WTO that is authorized to convict, and if necessary punish, states that do not fulfill their 
commitments. The rulings of the European Court of Justice – and albeit to a lesser 
extent those of the European Court of Human Rights – have gradually established both 
                                                 
1  This article presents preliminary results of the research project ‘Judicialization of International Dispute Settle-
ment’ which is part of the Research Center ‘Transformations of the State’ (TranState) funded by the German Re-
search Foundation (DFG). The analytical framework presented here is an offspring of the research project as a 
whole, which also includes Achim Helmedach, Gerald Neubauer and Michael Zürn. For their helpful comments 
on an earlier version of this paper we would like to thank all participants of the Section on “Legalization and 
World Politics” of the Pan-European International Relations Conference organized by the Standing Group on In-
ternational Relations (SGIR) of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) 2004 in The Hague. We 
are especially grateful to Jonas Tallberg and Nicole Deitelhoff who discussed this paper at the said conference. 
Moreover, we would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers of the Research Centers’ working paper series 
for their written comments. Last but not least we thank Vicki May for her linguistic assistance. 
2 For helpful discussions on the international rule of law see Watts (1993, 2000), Tamanaha (2004), Brownlie 
(1998). 
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direct effect and supremacy in domestic legal orders. Newly established international 
environmental regimes such as the ozone and the climate regime have various built-in, 
quasi-judicial procedures designed to cope with non-compliance.  
Many idealists that were engaged in the debates about international law of the 1950s 
and 1960s would have considered the gradual judicialization of international dispute 
settlement procedures to be final proof of an emergent international rule of law. For 
them the emergence of an international rule of law was mainly a matter of well-
designed – i.e. judicial rather than diplomatic – institutional dispute settlement 
procedures (Clark/Sohn 1960). These idealists believed that the judicialization of 
dispute settlement leads almost automatically to improved compliance with 
international law and also to a comparable treatment of comparable breaches of 
international law. Others however, already argued in these debates of the 1950s and 
1960s about international law that the judicialization of international dispute settlement 
procedures is hardly an indication of an emergent international rule of law. For these so-
called realists, it never was a matter of institutional design of dispute settlement 
procedures whether states comply with international law or not, and whether 
comparable breaches of international law were treated comparably. Rather, they 
assumed – and still suppose – that due to the anarchical structure in international 
relations, powerful states can and will act as they please in both judicial and traditional 
diplomatic dispute settlement procedures, while less powerful states have to suffer what 
they must (Morgenthau 1948). 
From our institutionalist point of view, however, it is entirely an empirical question 
whether – and if so where and when – judicialized dispute settlement procedures lead to 
a corresponding practice of judicialized dispute settlement. The appropiate question to 
ask is, if international dispute settlement procedures that institutionalize the principle to 
treat comparable breaches of international law alike, a principle fundamental to any 
order based on the rule of law, able to assure in fact like treatment of like cases. This 
empirical question cannot be answered with theoretical assumptions, be they idealist or 
realist. Idealist assumptions were clearly undermined by the fact that the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), with its judicialized dispute settlement procedure, has hardly 
transformed international practices of dispute settlement. Since the ICJ has rarely been 
invoked and its rulings often ignored, it could hardly be said to have institutionalized an 
international rule of law. But realist assumptions were also weakened by the fact that 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ), marked by a heavily judicialized process of 
dispute settlement, has transformed European dispute settlement. In contrast to the ICJ, 
the ECJ has regularly been invoked and its rulings usually followed, thereby 
establishing an international rule of law in Europe (Alter 2001). Hence, in the context of 
today’s judicialization of international dispute settlement procedures it remains an 
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empirical question whether a corresponding practice of dispute settlement emerges in 
which like breaches of international law are increasingly treated alike. 
Our research project, “The Judicialization of International Dispute Settlement” 
investigates whether the judicialization of international dispute settlement procedures 
coincides with a corresponding practice of judicialized dispute settlement among OECD 
countries. We employ a twofold comparison: firstly, we compare the dispute settlement 
procedures and their practical application within specified issues areas during the 1970s 
and 1980s with those of the 1990s and 2000s. This allows us to investigate 
transformations over time. Secondly, we analyze the procedures as well as the practice 
of dispute settlement across five issue areas, namely international trade (WTO), 
international security (UNSC), international labor standards (ILO), international human 
rights (CHR), and international environmental policies (CITES). This gives us the 
opportunity to compare transformations across issue areas. 
In this paper, however, we will focus on dispute settlement within the United Nations 
security regime, thereby illustrating the conceptual framework by which we intend to 
investigate the transformation of international dispute settlement both over time as well 
as across issue-areas. The paper will proceed in two steps. In a first step we lay out our 
conceptual framework, elaborating on how we intend to “measure” transformations of 
dispute settlement. In a second step we present some preliminary evidence with respect 
to dispute settlement within the United Nations Security Council. 
1. CONCEPT 
In our view, the emergence of an international rule of law depends on two conditions. 
First, the availability of judicialized dispute settlement procedures to parties involved in 
disputes about breaches of international law. Judicialized dispute settlement procedures 
alone might not ensure that like cases are treated alike, but without judicialized dispute 
settlement procedures a comparable treatment of comparable cases, a fundamental 
principle of any order based on the rule of law, would seem almost inconceivable 
(Keohane et al. 2000, Romano 1999).3 Second, judicialized dispute settlement 
procedures have to be put to practical application by states. One could hardly expect a 
comparable treatment of comparable cases if judicialized dispute settlement procedures 
were widely ignored. Hence, in our concept we only conceive of an international rule of 
law if both conditions are met: a formal judicialization of dispute settlement procedures 
as well as a practical application of such procedures (Zangl 2005 forthcoming). 
                                                 
3 While it is not a sufficient condition of an international rule of law, the judicialization of dispute settlement pro-
cedures is certainly a necessary condition (Watts 1993). 
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1.1. Judicialization of Dispute Settlement Procedures 
To carry out our investigation we first have to develop a concept that enables a 
comparison of the degree of judicialization of dispute settlement procedures both over 
time and across issue areas. In our concept, judicialization means that dispute settlement 
procedures, i.e. procedures designed to adjudicate in cases of disputes about breaches of 
international law, increasingly incorporate the normative principle of impartiality, i.e. 
the principle of a comparable treatment of comparable breaches of law.4 
Impartiality is by no means institutionalized through traditional diplomatic dispute 
settlement procedures based on inter-state negotiation and mediation (Morgenthau 
1948). Within the context of diplomatic dispute settlement procedures, more powerful 
states are more likely to get away with violations of their legal obligations while less 
powerful states are more likely to have to face consequences when committing similar 
violations (Zangl and Zürn 2004a). For example, although China and North Korea 
might have a similar human rights record, due to the diplomatic procedures of the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR), China has less cause to worry 
about United Nations resolutions condemning its human rights violations than North 
Korea. Because of the CHR’s lack of political independence, China can easily use its 
political power to prevent any resolution condemning its human rights violations from 
being adopted. 
Impartiality is certainly institutionalized to a far greater degree through judicial 
dispute settlement procedures (Keohane et al. 2000, Romano 1999). Under such 
procedures, based on independent courts, the likelihood of powerful actors having to 
face consequences when they violate their legal obligations should be similar to that of 
a less powerful actor committing a similar violation. For instance, infringements of 
comparable human rights practices by, say, Germany and Luxembourg are likely to lead 
to comparable legal consequences before the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR). The universal equal standing of all Europeans before the ECHR, its political 
                                                 
4 We consider judicialization processes as being part of more encompassing processes of legalization. Without 
going into details, we use a concept of legalization that derives on the one hand from Hart’s famous positivist 
concept of law as a system of primary and secondary rules, i.e. a system in which substantive rules are embedded 
in procedural rules that define legislation, adjudication and enforcement of substantive rules. Inspired on the other 
hand by Habermas’ normative concept of law, however, we concede that not all procedures to legislate, adjudi-
cate or enforce substantive rules indicate the same level of legalization. Accordingly, legalization depends on 
procedures meeting fundamental normative criteria such as democratic legislation, impartial adjudication and ef-
fective enforcement. Judicialization is considered to be legalization with respect to dispute settlement procedures, 
hence excluding legislation as well as enforcement procedures. For an overview of the discussion on so-called le-
galization in international politics see List/Zangl 2003 and Rustiala/Slaughter 2002. 
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independence from European governments, and its compulsory jurisdiction within 
Europe help ensure that power differentials between states like Germany and 
Luxembourg cannot affect the sentence.5 
In our research project, however, we cannot only rely on the dichotomous distinction 
between traditional diplomatic procedures on the one hand and judicial procedures on 
the other. Such a distinction is too crude to enable small real-world differences between 
different dispute settlement procedures to be captured. Moreover, many dispute 
settlement procedures in international relations today are located somewhere between 
traditional diplomatic means and newly emerging judicial procedures (Keohane et al 
2000; Merrills 1998). We therefore use a graded scale ranging from purely diplomatic to 
predominantly judicial procedures. Existing dispute settlement procedures can be 
situated on this scale and then be compared over time and across issue areas. This 
graded scale is based on five criteria all of which are considered institutional 
incarnations of the principle that like breaches of international law should be treated 
alike – regardless of an actor’s power position.6 Each grade as well as the overall scale 
can be considered to assess the institutional safeguards against political influence 
privileging legal reasoning. The comments on each criterion are arranged from 
diplomatic procedures to increasing judicialized procedures. 
(1) Political independence: The political independence of the relevant dispute 
settlement procedures is a criterion of the utmost importance for an impartial treatment 
of breaches of international law (Keohane et al. 2000, 459-462, Helfer/Slaughter 1997, 
353-355). If states are allowed to exert their influence on decision-making in 
international dispute settlement procedures, powerful states will be able to use this to 
their advantage and less powerful states will suffer disadvantages. Concentrating on the 
composition of dispute settlement bodies to asses their vulnerability to political 
influence, we distinguish four grades. The least independent bodies are those including 
the conflicting parties because they are extremely open to political meddling. An 
example for such a procedure is the original GATT dispute settlement procedure, in 
which so-called working parties were assigned the task of providing a platform for 
mediation and negotiation between disputing states. If third parties make a decision, the 
procedure is less vulnerable to political influence and therefore slightly more 
independent. The later GATT dispute settlement procedures, based on so-called panels, 
might illustrate that. Sufficiently independent bodies are those composed of experts, as 
                                                 
5 However, the degree to which power can affect court rulings is a matter of debate even with respect to the Euro-
pean Court of Justice (see for example Garrett 1995; Mattli and Slaughter 1995). 
6 For similar criteria to distinguish diplomatic and judicial dispute settlement procedures see Keohane et al. 2000, 
Zangl 2001, Yarbrough/Yarbrough 1997, McCall 2000, Zangl/Zürn 2004a. 
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in the WTO panels. Only a standing body of judges, however, can be considered as 
truly independent. The WTO Appellate Body is a case in point. 
(2) Legal mandate: Even completely independent dispute settlement bodies cannot 
guarantee a like treatment of like cases. It is also important to assess what kind of 
mandate is assigned to a dispute settlement body. While a political mandate opens up 
the dispute settlement procedure to political interests, a judicial mandate ensures legal 
reasoning. Again, we distinguish four grades: We talk about a political mandate if the 
decision ensuing from the dispute settlement procedure is based on political 
considerations. The UN Security Council is a prominent example. The rulings of a 
somewhat more judicialized mandate draw on legal arguments without being legally 
binding for the conflicting parties. Typically, such procedures also lack strict procedural 
rules. Dispute settlement under CITES can be classed in this grade. If the mandate 
requires decisions to be based on legal grounds only and to be made in line with an 
institutionalized procedure, the mandate is largely judicialized even if the decisions are 
still not legally binding. ICJ advisory opinions belong in this category. Only procedures 
that feature binding rules of due process and are authorized to take legally binding 
decisions can be considered to have a fully judicialized mandate, as for instance is the 
case with the European Court of Human Rights.  
(3) Compulsory jurisdiction: The compulsory jurisdiction of the relevant dispute 
settlement procedure is another, equally important criterion for a comparable treatment 
of comparable cases (Morgenthau 1948, McCall 2000: 139-140). If a dispute settlement 
procedure is not mandatory or if a mandatory procedure allows for ways to inhibit parts 
of the procedure, impartiality is not ensured. For example, if the disputing states 
themselves have the authority to decide whether they accept the jurisdiction of the 
relative dispute settlement body or not, powerful states can force less powerful states to 
accept the procedures while they are at liberty to block procedures if they are directed 
against them (Zangl/Zürn 2004a). Therefore, we grade jurisdiction as follows: the most 
restricted form of jurisdiction is when the states involved in a dispute can block both the 
initiation of the procedures as well as the adoption of the rulings made within these 
procedures. This was the case within the GATT dispute settlement procedures, for 
instance due to the GATT Council’s consensual decision-making procedure. 
Jurisdiction also remains quite restricted when disputing states can only block either the 
initiation of the relevant procedure or the respective ruling. The International Court of 
Justice’s jurisdiction, for instance, is severely compromised by the right of disputing 
states to dismiss its involvement. Where dispute settlement procedures can only be 
blocked by a collective of states, rather than by single states involved in a dispute, 
jurisdiction can be described as quasi-compulsory. Such quasi-compulsory jurisdiction 
can be identified within the ILO, whose Governing Body can approve reports of the 
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Committee on Freedom of Association by simple majority. True compulsory 
jurisdiction, however, requires that the relevant dispute settlement procedures and their 
respective rulings may not be blocked either by individual states or by a collective of 
states.  
(4) Authority to sanction: The authority to decide on sanctions in cases in which 
states do not comply with rulings made within the dispute settlement procedures can be 
regarded as another relevant criterion for the comparable treatment of comparable cases 
(Morgenthau 1948, Zangl/Zürn 2004). If adverse rulings cannot be enforced under the 
relevant dispute settlement procedures, defendant states might feel the incentive to 
either ignore sanctions, and complainant states endeavor to enforce them single-
handedly. The least judicialized procedures are therefore those that do not regulate 
sanctions at all, as in the case of the ILO, for example. Under certain dispute settlement 
procedures, states can be authorized to impose sanctions, but such authorizations can 
also be blocked by the defendant state. This, again, was a persistent problem under the 
old GATT regime. Under the more judicialized WTO regime, however, authorized 
sanctions may not be blocked by the parties involved, while at the same time states are 
not allowed to impose sanctions without WTO authorization. However, the WTO 
dispute settlement procedure cannot order complainant states to employ sanctions 
against defendants that ignore their rulings. A fully judicialized regulation on sanctions 
requires the authority to mandate sanctions. The Security Council's dispute settlement 
procedure is the most prominent example of a procedure that can mandate states to 
impose sanctions.  
(5) Access: A further criterion for a comparable treatment of comparable cases 
concerns accessibility to dispute settlement procedures (Keohane et al. 2000: 462-466, 
Zangl 2001: 57). The wider the avenue to dispute settlement procedures are, the more 
likely that breaches of international law are reported and dealt with. The most common 
provision is also the most restrictive, allowing only states access to formal procedures. 
Access is somewhat more open where either international organizations or non-
governmental organizations may initiate proceedings. For instance, under CITES the 
treaty organization’s secretariat can initiate dispute settlement procedures while at the 
ILO trade unions may do so. Of course, access widens if both international 
organizations and NGOs have that right. The highest degree of access allows 
individuals to address the dispute settlement procedure directly. The most prominent 
examples are some procedures within the UN human rights regimes as well as the 
European Court of Human Rights. 
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Table 1: A Gradual Scale Ranging from Diplomatic to Judicial Procedures 
Political Independence 
(Third party’s composition) 
diplomatic procedure: politically dependent 
¾ Representatives of the parties involved 
¾ Representatives of third parties 
¾ Experts acting in their individual capacity 
¾ Standing body of independent judges 
judicial procedure: politically independent 
Legal Mandate 
(Third party’s role) 
diplomatic procedure: political mandate 
¾ Procedure culminates in a political decision 
¾ Non-binding procedure culminates in a legal decision 
¾ Binding proceeding culminates in a judicial recommendation 
¾ Binding proceeding culminates in a legal decision 
judicial procedure: judicial mandate 
Compulsory Jurisdiction 
(Third party’s decision-
making authority) 
diplomatic procedure: case-by-case jurisdiction 
¾ Procedure and ruling can be blocked by parties involved 
¾ Procedure or ruling can be blocked by parties involved 
¾ Procedure and/or ruling can only be blocked by majority  
decision 
¾ Neither procedure nor ruling can be blocked 
judicial procedure: compulsory jurisdiction 
Authority to Sanction 
(Third party’s authority to 
sanction) 
diplomatic procedure: limited authority to sanction 
¾ No regulation on sanctions 
¾ Sanctions can be authorized, but also blocked by defendant  
¾ Sanctions can be authorized 
¾ Sanctions can be mandated 
judicial procedure: authority to sanction 
Access 
(Third party procedure 
open to whom?) 
diplomatic procedure: limited access 
¾ Only states have access 
¾ IOs or NGOs also have access  
¾ Individuals also have access 
judicial procedure: open access 
 
Based on the five criteria and their respective degrees we are able to situate each and 
every international dispute settlement procedure on a scale of dispute settlement 
procedures ranging from purely diplomatic to predominantly judicial. This should allow 
us to trace the judicialization of dispute settlement procedures over time and across 
issue areas.  
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1.2. Judicialization of Dispute Settlement 
In our view, the judicialization of dispute settlement procedures by itself does not 
indicate the emergence of an international rule of law. Admittedly, through their 
judicialization international dispute settlement procedures increasingly institutionalize 
the prerequisites for a comparable treatment of comparable cases. But it nevertheless 
remains an open question whether judicialized dispute settlement systems have an effect 
on states’ actual dispute settlement practices. To answer this question we need to know 
whether parties to international disputes actually make use of available dispute 
settlement procedures and if so, how. 
So far, however, most research focuses on the procedures rather than the practice of 
dispute settlement (Keohane/Moravcsik/Slaughter 2001, Romano 1999). Moreover, 
research on the impact of procedures on the practice of dispute settlement focuses only 
on a sample of disputes that are dealt with in the context of the pertinent dispute 
settlement procedures while neglecting all disputes that are dealt with outside these 
dispute settlement procedures (Bush/Reinhardt 2002, 2003). While this kind of research 
is important, it clearly relies on samples with a selection bias. Disputes that are dealt 
with through dispute settlement procedures can hardly be regarded as representative for 
all disputes that might end up in the respective dispute settlement procedures. They 
might be especially hard or especially easy to deal with, but they are by no means 
representative. What is more, by drawing a sample that focuses only on disputes that are 
brought to the attention of the relevant dispute settlement procedures, such studies have 
two further shortcomings. First, it does not acknowledge that an increasing use of the 
relevant dispute settlement procedures might reflect an increasing total number of 
disputes that are dealt with outside the relevant procedures rather than a growing 
propensity of states to use the available dispute settlement procedures. We therefore 
argue that increasing numbers of cases dealt with through dispute settlement procedures 
should not be seen as direct evidence of an emergent international rule of law. Second, 
such studies cannot take into consideration that in the light of effective dispute 
settlement procedures the number of bilateral settlements “out of court” might increase, 
without any change in the quantity of settlements through relevant dispute settlement 
procedures. Therefore, even decreasing numbers of cases within dispute settlement 
procedures should not be interpreted as clear evidence against the emergence of an 
international rule of law. 
We seek to remedy these shortcomings by working with a more representative 
sample that includes disputes irrespective of whether the relevant dispute settlement 
procedures were involved or not. In order to identify disputes we first selected specific 
legal obligations or bundles of legal obligations in each issue area under consideration. 
We then systematically searched for complaints about violations thereof. For each issue 
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area we collected complaints about violations within two time periods, one within the 
1970s and 1980s and another one within the 1990s and early 2000s. The reason for our 
focus on OECD countries is that these countries have integrated international law and 
treaties into their own legislation to a greater degree than non-OECD countries, and they 
also exercise the greatest influence on the formulation of international law and treaties.  
By comparing the dispute settlement practice over two distinct time periods we expect 
to obtain an accurate picture of potential changes in the practice of dispute settlement – 
both across time and across issue areas. 
The chief advantage of our sample is that we are able to identify whether conflicting 
parties actually use the available dispute settlement procedures to deal with breaches of 
international law. In order to assess the dispute settlement practice we will produce a 
brief, structured description – or case-study – for each dispute, outlining the behavior of 
each party during the dispute in question. Generally, a party behaves either consistently 
with the relevant dispute settlement procedure, or inconsistently with it. In order to 
demonstrate that judicialized practices of international dispute settlement are emerging 
we have to establish whether the percentage of behavior consistent with the relevant 
procedures has increased while at the same time the percentage of the disputes which 
were handled adverse to the procedures has decreased . For a more accurate assessment 
of each party's behavior, it is helpful to further distinguish their behavior into the 
following categories:  
(1) Following procedures: A party may conform to the procedure. This entails the 
party’s willingness to settle the dispute as envisaged by the relevant dispute 
settlement procedure. For instance, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the 
United States turned to the UN Security Council. The subsequent sanctions 
and eventual US-led military operation were authorized by the Council. 
(2) Avoiding procedures: A party may seek a settlement outside of the relevant 
procedure. While avoiding the relevant dispute settlement procedure, a 
settlement may be reached by drawing on the respective legal norms. In many 
dispute settlement procedures the disputing parties are free or even encouraged 
to settle a dispute by lawful means. As the Security Council would not foster a 
settlement between Guatemala and Belize, both states entered bilateral 
negotiations. Such a settlement is, one might say, placed in the shadow of the 
law. 
(3) Manipulating procedures: A party may choose to use the relevant dispute 
settlement procedure but at the same time seek to manipulate its orderly 
operation. Such behavior is clearly inconsistent with the procedure, but still 
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indicates that the party attributes some importance to it – otherwise the party 
would simply disregard it completely. In the run-up to the US war on Iraq that 
began in 2003, the United States tried to present their case before the Security 
Council. However, they not only presented manipulated evidence but also 
tried to buy the votes of some Security Council members. 
(4)  Disregarding procedures: A party may choose to disregard the relevant 
dispute settlement procedure completely. In such a case, the party would either 
not seek a settlement through the procedure, or even ignore a ruling – i.e. the 
party is unwilling to accept any restraints on its course of action. When the 
Security Council could not agree on the Kosovo crisis in 1999, NATO went 
ahead with its proposed air strikes anyway. 
Illustration 1: Possible behavior of disputing parties 
  
When categorizing the behavior of the parties in the course of the relevant procedures 
we have to take into account the fact that during a dispute conflicting parties typically 
might switch back and forth between behavior categories. We will therefore divide each 
dispute into four analytical phases and assess the behavior of each party for each phase 
individually.7  
¾ First, a complaints phase, in which one party publicly accuses another party of 
allegedly violating international legal obligations; 
¾ Second, an adjudication phase, in which at least one of the conflicting parties 
seeks a ruling through the relevant dispute settlement procedure;  
¾ Third, an implementation phase, in which the conflicting parties have to 
implement the ruling made under the dispute settlement procedure;  
                                                 
7 In addition, by distinguishing different phases of a dispute and analyzing dispute settlements in each and every 
phase we also increase the number of cases we can rely on. Despite the fact that the dispute settlement practice in 
an earlier phase might have some impact on dispute settlement in later phases the increase in the number of cases 
should add some extra reliability to our results (King/Keohane/Verba 1994: 221-223). 
(3) 
manipulate 
procedure 
consistent with the adjudication procedure 
(1) 
conform to 
procedure 
(2) 
avoid proce-
dure legally 
adverse to the adjudication procedure 
(4) 
disregard 
procedure 
illegaly 
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¾ fourth, an enforcement phase, in which sanctions might be employed because 
one of the conflicting parties refuses to respect the ruling.  
Overall, comparing the 1970s and 1980s with the 1990s and 2000s, our concept for the 
assessment of states’ dispute settlement behavior, in conjunction with our gradual scale 
of different dispute settlement procedures, should allow an adequate analysis as to 
whether international dispute settlement in the five issue areas selected for investigation 
has been judicialized. In the next section of this paper we will utilize the concept 
portrayed here  to study the judicialization of international dispute settlement in the 
issue area of international security.  
2. THE CASE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
To study the judicialization of dispute settlement in the issue area of international 
security we focus on international disputes that have been deemed to threaten 
international peace. As the UN Security Council (SC) is stipulated to have the primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, it is the obvious 
dispute settlement procedure to study. 
2.1. Judicialization of Procedures 
The United Nations Charter places states under the obligation to settle their disputes 
peacefully. If the states involved in a dispute that might endanger international peace are 
unable or unwilling to reach a settlement, they are called upon to refer the matter to the 
United Nations Security Council. At the same time, the SC may in its own right 
investigate any dispute that threatens international peace and make recommendations at 
any time. Additionally, any state – be it a member state or not – may draw the attention 
of the SC to any situation endangering peace. The Council is then supposed to take 
action with a view to settling the dispute, for instance by making recommendations or 
even mandating appropriate measures. The Security Council thus functions as an 
international dispute settlement body. Looking at its dispute settlement procedures, no 
process of judicialization has taken place. Its procedures are rather political than judi-
cial. 
(1) Political independence: The SC can hardly be considered a politically 
independent body. Delegates to the SC are state representatives, who are primarily duty-
bound to serve given state interests, and much less to upholding norms of international 
law. The cultural, economic and political diversity of the five permanent and ten non-
permanent SC member states ensures some diversity of interests, however. Moreover, 
all decisions require nine affirmative votes and no negative vote by any of the five 
permanent members granted the power of veto. While this makes it hard for a single 
state to push through singular interests, it tends to reinforce interest-based bargaining 
rather than advancing impartial legal reasoning. This is even truer when delegates have 
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to decide on disputes in which their states are either involved or have vested interests. 
The Council’s decision-making can therefore hardly be conceived of as being free of 
political motivations (Koskenniemi 1998).  
(2) Legal mandate:  The mandate of the SC has always been a political mandate. 
While the Council is supposed to settle all disputes relating to international peace and 
security, there is no clear-cut obligation on the part of the SC to do so. It has 
considerable leeway in deciding whether to take on a matter or not. When dealing with a 
matter, the Council is supposed to make political decisions. Decisions have to conform 
to international law, but are not grounded in legal reasoning only. Nor is there a fixed 
formal procedure on how to arrive at a ruling. Nevertheless, SC resolutions passed 
under Chapter VII of the Charter are legally binding on all member states.8  
(3) Compulsory jurisdiction: The jurisdiction of the SC seems to be compulsory. The 
United Nations Charter gives the SC the authority to exercise jurisdiction over all 
disputes endangering international peace. So any disputing party could be subjected to 
SC decisions. Because of the required majority of nine affirmative votes it would at first 
glance appear hard for any state to prevent the SC from denouncing any threat to peace 
it might have committed. However, while it is difficult for a single state to keep a matter 
off the agenda, in some circumstances the adoption of rulings can be blocked. The 
permanent members can veto any decision, and are therefore not subject to the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the SC. No provision inhibits permanent members from 
using their veto to protect allied or friendly countries or blocking decisions on certain 
types of conflict. For example, the United States frequently protects Israel from harsh 
critique relating to Israel’s conduct in the Occupied Territories. Although less 
commonly used since the end of the Cold War, the veto still substantially limits the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the SC. However, other than by veto, only a coalition of 
states can block a decision. Seven negative votes are needed for a blocking minority. As 
long as the allegation is not directed against a veto power, the procedure cannot be 
inhibited by an individual state. 
(4) Authority to sanction: After having determined that a situation constitutes a threat 
to peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression, the SC may impose enforcement 
measures. It may mandate all UN member states to apply non-military enforcement 
measures, such as economic embargos. The SC has in the past also authorized member 
states to use military enforcement measures. Although the UN Charter provides for 
military forces to be placed at the disposal of the SC, these special agreements have 
                                                 
8 There is, however, some debate as to whether SC recommendations are also legally binding with the same force 
or are more of a guideline for states. For the purposes of this study, this point is negligible, however, because we 
are exclusively concerned dealing with Chapter VII decisions. 
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never been signed. For this reason the SC has contented itself with the authorization of 
the use of “all necessary means” and does not actually order member states to engage in 
military enforcement operations. While it is questionable whether the SC may mandate 
military enforcement measures, no official objections have been raised against its 
practice of authorizing the use of force (Blokker 2000: 568). In sum, the SC has an 
unusually high degree of authority to enforce its rulings through sanctions, even though 
it remains highly dependent on the willingness of member states to actually enforce its 
resolutions. 
(5) Access to the dispute settlement procedures of the SC is restricted to states only. 
Although the UN Secretary-General can bring any matter which may threaten 
international peace to the attention of the SC, he cannot formally force the Council to 
decide on these matters. The fact that only states have access puts secession movements 
at a disadvantage, for instance, which are involved in conflicts with their respective 
governments. For example, in the late 1990s the Kosovo Albanians could not bring their 
dispute with Serbia before the SC themselves. Such parties to a conflict must find a 
recognized state to represent their concern. 
Table 2: The Judicialization of SC Procedures 
Political 
Independence 
Legal  
Mandate 
Compulsory 
Jurisdiction 
Authority to 
Sanction Access 
very low 
(political body 
composed of state 
representatives) 
low 
(political decisions, 
but binding on 
member states) 
high 
(resolutions can 
only be blocked by 
qualified majority 
or by one of the 
veto- powers) 
very high 
(sanctions can be 
authorized and/or 
mandated; only 
qualified majority 
or veto-powers can 
block sanctions) 
very low 
(only states can 
refer matters to the 
SC) 
 
Overall, no judicialization of the dispute settlement procedures of the SC has taken 
place. The degree of judicialization of its procedures remains rather low. Although the 
Council’s procedures score very high in terms of authority to sanction and their 
compulsory jurisdiction, their score is low with respect to their legal mandate and 
particularly low with regard to their political independence and accessibility.  
2.2. Judicialization of Dispute Settlement  
We now turn to the practice of dispute settlement within the United Nations Security 
Council  procedure. As there has been no change in the Council’s dispute settlement 
procedures, it becomes even more important to study the practice of dispute settlement 
in order to identify a possible judicialization in this issue area. To do so, we will carry 
out a systematic comparison of SC involvement as well as non-involvement in disputes 
that were deemed to have threatened international peace in the 1970s and 1980s with its 
involvement and/or non-involvement in comparable disputes in the 1990s. So far, most 
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of the research done on the Council’s involvement in these disputes focuses only on a 
sample of disputes in which the SC actually became involved and eventually authorized 
military or non-military enforcement measures, while largely ignoring all those disputes 
in which the SC was not involved.9 Our research, by contrast, will focus on a less biased 
and more representative sample of disputes in which the Security Council could have 
become involved. 
The starting point of our research are complaints about threats to peace and alleged 
acts of aggression. These complaints will form the sample of disputes based on which 
we will analyze SC involvement more closely. As we are interested in a sample that 
includes disputes irrespective of whether the due dispute settlement procedure has been 
applied or not, it was necessary to find a source other than the SC agenda. Eventually 
we decided to work with letters from states, addressed to either the UN Security Council 
or the UN Secretary-General, containing formal complaints about another state 
allegedly threatening international peace or having committed acts of aggression. Even 
though these letters already indicate the complaining state’s willingness to involve the 
SC, they say nothing about the willingness on the part of the other party to the dispute. 
Such complaints, moreover, are no guarantee for actual SC engagement. Thus, while 
this source cannot be considered to be completely independent of the SC procedure, its 
link to the Council does not amount to a formal initiation of a dispute settlement 
process.  
The sample of disputes drawn up on the basis of letters to the Security Council or the 
Secretary-General should enable us to detect whether there are any changes in the usage 
of the SC dispute settlement procedures. To facilitate the investigation of the Council’s 
involvement in disputes we have limited our search to complaints filed either by an 
OECD member state or against an OECD member state.10 We also narrowed our search 
to complaints filed within two time periods. The first period covers the years 1974 to 
1983, the second one runs from 1990 to 1999. This search strategy produced about 250 
complaints, which amount to 43 disputes when sorted according to conflict issues.11 
There are 21 cases in the first period, 22 cases in the second one. 
A superficial survey of these letters containing allegations of threats to peace, 
breaches of peace and acts of aggression soon reveals that states make frequent use of 
                                                 
9 The debate clearly focuses on the issue of humanitarian intervention. See for example Abiew 1998, Garrett 1999, 
Murphy 1996, Ramsbotham/Woodhouse 1996, Wheeler 2000. 
10 We included all current OECD member states in the search over the entire period regardless of the actual date 
that an individual state joined. 
11 The number of cases is so much lower because usually all parties to a dispute will refer the matter to the SC 
several times. 
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this instrument to draw the attention of the UN Security Council or the UN Secretary-
General to a wide range of disputes. This validates these letters as a reliable source for 
drawing a sample of disputes over alleged threats to international peace. Moreover, it 
becomes quite clear that the choice of wording in these letters is very cautious. 
Although many disputes are discussed, only few are actually labeled as 'threats to 
peace'. States seem to be very mindful of the severity of such allegations because of 
their potentially grave consequences. Alleged acts of aggression are almost as common 
as alleged threats to peace, but these mostly refer to isolated incidents and not to a 
conflict situation as a whole. 
The first period includes some allegations deriving from the struggle against 
colonialism (Congo against Portugal, Comoros against France as well as Somalia 
against France, Western Sahara and Belize), protests against wars conducted by 
apartheid regimes (Southern Rhodesia and South Africa), military interventions (Turkey 
in Cyprus, Indonesia in East Timor, Soviet Union in Afghanistan, United States in 
Grenada), a dispute over fishing rights (Iceland against United Kingdom), the Sino-
Vietnamese border dispute, the Teheran hostage crisis, the Israeli attack on an Iraqi 
nuclear reactor, the Falkland war, covert operations in Nicaragua, the situation in 
Lebanon, also Libya charging the United states on several counts, the possible 
deployment of neutron bombs in South Korea, and the singular event of Mexico 
challenging Spain’s membership of the UN. 
Table 3: Identified disputes 1974-1983 
Issue Complaining State Defendant State 
Portuguese Aggression against Congo Congo Portugal 
Turkish Intervention in Northern Cyprus Greece Turkey 
Spain’s membership of UN Mexico Spain 
Status of Western Sahara Spain Morocco 
Indonesian Intervention in East Timor Portugal Indonesia 
Cod War (fishing rights) Iceland United Kingdom 
Independence of Comoros Uganda France 
Incident at border between colonial French 
Territory and Somalia Somalia France 
Southern Rhodesian Aggression against 
Mozambique Portugal Southern Rhodesia 
China-Vietnam Border Dispute Warsaw Pact members and NATO members PR China 
Teheran Hostage Crisis United States Iran 
Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan 53 Western and non-aligned states Soviet Union 
United States Aggression against Libya Libya United States 
South African Aggression against Angola Spain South Africa 
Israeli attack on Iraqi nuclear reactor Japan, Spain, Poland, Hungary Israel 
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Table 3: Identified disputes 1974-1983 (continued) 
Issue Complaining State Defendant State 
US support for counter-revolutionary 
insurgents in Nicaragua Nicaragua United States, Honduras 
Status of Belize Guatemala United Kingdom 
Falkland War United Kingdom, EC Argentina 
deployment of neutron bombs in South 
Korea North Korea United States 
US intervention in Grenada Nicaragua United States 
situation in Lebanon (complaint by Syria) Syria United States 
 
The second period comprises the United States intervention in Panama, tensions 
between Cuba and the United States, Iraq’s attack on Kuwait, the repression of civilian 
population in Iraq and the resulting no-fly zones in Iraq, Iranian complaints against 
United States shipping inspections in the Persian Gulf, ongoing tensions between Libya 
and the United States, the wars in Yugoslavia and Kosovo, the nuclear issue of North 
Korea, a North Korean missile test, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Rwandan 
genocide, a protest against a UN-authorized military operation in Haiti, internal unrest 
in Afghanistan, the Aegean border dispute between Greece and Turkey, the Cyprus 
question, Turkish military operations in Northern Iraq, nuclear bomb tests in South 
Asia, and the United States bombing of a chemical plant in Sudan. 
Table 4: Identified disputes 1990-1999 
Issue Complaining State Defendant State 
US intervention in Panama Nicaragua United States 
Forced inspection of Cuban vessel Cuba United States 
Iraqi attack on Kuwait Italy (EC), United States, and others Iraq 
blockade of ships in the Persian Gulf Libya, Iraq United States, United Kingdom, Australia 
Iraqi repression of civilian population Turkey, France, Germany, United Kingdom, United States Iraq 
no-fly zones in Northern and Southern 
Iraq Iraq 
United Kingdom, United 
States, France 
harassment of Iranian vessels and air 
planes Iran United States 
US military cooperation with Israel; US 
pressure for regime change in Libya Libya United States 
deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia 
(Croatia’s war of secession) Canada, Hungary  
War in Bosnia and Herzegovina Canada, EC, Turkey  
deteriorating situation in Kosovo United Kingdom FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) 
North Korean nuclear issue North Korea United States 
North Korean missile test Japan North Korea 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict Turkey Armenia 
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Table 4: Identified disputes 1990-1999 (continued) 
Issue Complaining State Defendant State 
Situation in Rwanda (genocide) France  
Threat of intervention in Haiti Libya United States 
persistent unrest in Afghanistan France (EU)  
Aegean boundary line Greece Turkey 
construction of military fortifications 
along the Green Line Cyprus Turkey 
Turkish military operations in Northern 
Iraq Iraq, Libya Turkey 
nuclear bomb tests by India and Pakistan Australia, Canada, New Zealand and others India, Pakistan 
US bombing of chemical factory in 
Sudan Sudan, League of Arab States United States 
 
As we are presenting ongoing research we clearly cannot discuss the final results at this 
stage. Currently we are in the process of drawing up the structured descriptions of each 
dispute determining the behavior of each state involved in the respective dispute. By 
using some tentative indicators for the SC involvement in these disputes we can, 
nevertheless, present some preliminary findings. For each of the four phases a dispute 
might pass through we employ a different indicator for SC involvement.  
Complaints phase: In the complaints phase we use formal SC meetings as an 
indicator for its involvement in attempts to settle the disputes included in our sample. If 
there has been a formal meeting over the dispute in question we consider this to be an 
indication of SC involvement.12 If no meeting took place this can be regarded as an 
indication that the SC was, if at all, hardly involved. During the first time period (1974-
1983), 15 out of 21 cases were on the agenda of at least one formal SC meeting. During 
the second period (1990-1999), only 12 out of 22 cases were formally discussed within 
the SC. Thus, in the first period 71% of the complaints were dealt with in conformity 
with procedure in the complaints phase as compared to 55% in the second period. 
Contrary to the widespread assumption that the SC has been addressed more often since 
the end of the Cold War, it has in fact responded to less concerns aired by UN members 
in the 1990s than in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Adjudication phase: As an indicator for the involvement of the SC in attempts to 
settle the disputes included in our sample during the adjudication phase we employ the 
resolutions adopted by the SC.  These resolutions can be regarded as equivalent to a 
court’s rulings on alleged violations of international law. It seems justifiable to regard 
                                                 
12 The provisional agenda for a Security Council meeting is prepared by the Secretary-General and then approved 
by the President of the Security Council. Nevertheless, the agenda has to be adopted at each meeting by nine af-
firmative votes. The adoption of the agenda cannot be blocked by a veto. 
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resolutions passed by the SC as an indication for its involvement in attempts to settle 
disputes during the adjudication phase, while cases in which no resolution was adopted 
might be seen as an indication that the SC was hardly – or at least not successfully – 
involved in attempts to settle the dispute in question. In the first time period under 
consideration, resolutions were adopted in nine out of the 15 disputes in which a SC 
meeting took place. The nature of the SC resolutions varies greatly, however. In some 
instances, the SC merely expresses its concern about a state’s conduct; in other 
instances it condemns particular acts or demands specific actions. In four instances a 
draft resolution was vetoed, twice by the United States and once by the Soviet Union 
and France respectively. No draft resolution was introduced in the remaining two 
disputes (French-Somali border incident and the Cod War). In the second time period, 
resolutions were adopted in ten out of twelve disputes. One draft resolution was vetoed 
(by the United States) whereas in the remaining case (inspection of a Cuban vessel) no 
draft resolution was put to vote. A comparison of the two periods thus shows that the 
SC clearly adopted more resolutions in response to alleged threats to peace during the 
1990s (83%) than during the 1970s/1980s (60%). As the procedure explicitly allows a 
veto by the permanent members, a veto cannot be interpreted as behavior adverse to the 
dispute settlement procedure. In terms of the SC procedure, however, these instances 
amount to an acquittal of the allegations and reveal the flaws of the procedure. If one 
includes the vetoes in the number of rulings, then the number of judgements passed by 
the SC rises to 92% of all disputes debated during the 1990s, and during the earlier 
period to 87% of all disputes debated. 
Implementation phase: With respect to the implementation phase we must rely on an 
admittedly somewhat rough indicator for SC involvement in attempts to settle the 
disputes in our sample. We use iterated resolutions on the same dispute as an indication 
for the SC’s involvement in dispute settlement. If there are more than one resolution on 
the same dispute we can reasonably assume that there were difficulties in implementing 
of the first resolution. In most instances, the subsequent resolutions eventually reaffirm 
all relevant previous ones, while occasionally adding new demands. An increase of 
iterated resolutions might be seen as an indication of decreasing willingness to comply 
with SC resolutions. However, iterated resolutions also show the SC is still concerned 
with the dispute in question and urges the implementation of its prior resolutions. 
Assuming that state compliance with SC resolutions did not change dramatically over 
time, we therefore regard iterated resolutions as an indication of an effort on the part of 
the SC to counter non-compliance in the implementation phase. To increase the 
leverage we only include disputes in this count if there have been more than two follow-
up resolutions. In the 1990s seven out of ten SC resolutions were repeated, while in the 
1970s/1980s only two out of nine resolutions were reaffirmed. The SC iterated its 
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resolutions in only 29% of the cases in the earlier time period compared to 70% in the 
later one. Again, supposing a stable (but low) compliance rate this development 
indicates states are more likely to get caught in instances of non-compliance during the 
1990s. In turn, this points to an increased judicialization of the dispute settlement in 
practice because of the greater emphasis on actual implementation. 
Enforcement phase: SC resolutions authorizing or mandating sanctions against states 
that do not comply with its rulings can be used as an indicator for its involvement in 
dispute settlement in the enforcement phase. In general it is assumed that the SC was 
much more hesitant to employ enforcement measures during the Cold War than after it. 
Indeed, the number of instances in which it mandated non-military enforcement 
measures has increased and its authorization of military enforcement measures is 
entirely new. Yet when turning from absolute numbers to relative numbers, as in our 
sample, the increasing involvement of the SC does not appear that striking. Between 
1974 and 1983 the SC repeated resolutions in only two cases out of our sample, thereby 
indicating that the disputing parties had not complied with its prior resolutions. But only 
in one of these instances did the SC impose economic sanctions (against Southern 
Rhodesia) whereas the other instance (Turkish military intervention in Cyprus) was not 
responded to with enforcement measures. In the 1990s the SC repeated seven 
resolutions – thereby indicating a lack of compliance – and decided in four of these 
instances to employ enforcement measures. Hence the percentage has not changed 
dramatically. In all these cases the SC eventually authorized not only non-military but 
also military enforcement measures. 
Table 5: The Practice of SC Dispute Settlement 
SC-Action No SC-Action Phase 
Indicator 1974-1983 1990-1999 1974-1983 1990-1999 
Direction of Change 
Complaints Phase 
Formal SC meeting 15 (21) 12 (22) 6 (21) 10 (22) moderate decrease  ↓ 
Adjudication Phase 
SC resolution  9 (15) 10 (12) 6 (15)  2 (12) significant increase ↑ 
Implementation Phase 
repeated resolution 
2 ( 9)  7 (10) 7 ( 9)  3 (10) significant increase ↑ 
Enforcement Phase 
enforcement measure 1 ( 2)  4 ( 7) 1 ( 2)  3 ( 7) moderate increase   ↑ 
Note: Numbers in brackets specify the total number of disputes included in the preceding phase. 
In sum, although no judicialization of the SC’s procedures has taken place, the practice 
of dispute settlement – i.e. the SC’s involvement in attempts to settle disputes that might 
threaten international peace – has been judicialized. While this is not the case with 
regard to the complaints phase, this process of judicialization holds particularly true for 
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the adjudication and implementation phases and can also be regarded – albeit to a lesser 
extent – as a reality for the enforcement phase. 
3. CONCLUSION 
Is an international rule of law in the issue area of international security emerging? As 
we posit that this question cannot be satisfactorily answered by theoretical assumptions, 
we undertook an empirical study of international dispute settlement in the issue area of 
security. As we claim, moreover, that this question can only be answered by looking not 
only at the relevant dispute settlement procedures, but also at the corresponding practice 
of dispute settlement, we proceeded to analyze both the judicialization of the procedures 
as well as the practices of dispute settlement in the issue area of international security. 
The empirical study demonstrates that no judicialization of the relevant dispute 
settlement procedure has taken place. The degree of judicialization of the dispute 
settlement procedure within the framework of the United Nations Security Council 
remains low. In particular, its procedures show a low degree of judicialization in terms 
of political independence, legal mandate, and access, while they score somewhat higher 
in terms of jurisdiction and authority to sanction. Nonetheless, our comparison of the 
periods 1974-1983 and 1990-1999 points to the judicialization of dispute settlement 
practice within the SC. In our sample of 43 disputes we observed – with the exception 
of the initial complaints phase – an increasing involvement of the SC. Overall, we tend 
to interpret these results as an indication for a moderate process of judicialization of 
international dispute settlement. If existing procedures – no matter how low their degree 
of judicialization might be – are increasingly used and accepted, this can be seen as an 
indication – albeit moderate – of an emerging international rule of law in the issue area 
of international security.  
Whether this process of the 1990s continues into the 2000s, or whether – in 
retrospect – the decade after the end of the Cold War has to be considered the Golden 
Age of the Security Council, remains to be seen. In any case the experience from the 
1990s seems to indicate that an international rule of law is not just a utopian vision but a 
real possibility, even in the issue area of international security. 
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ANNEX :  HANDLING OF DISPUTES WITHIN THE SC DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE 
Table A: Disputes from 1974 to 1983 
 
 
Phase 
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Portuguese Aggression against Congo N N N N 
Turkish Intervention in Northern Cyprus Y Y Y (many) N 
Spain’s membership of UN N N N N 
Status of Western Sahara Y Y (just 2) N 
Indonesian Intervention in East Timor Y Y (just 1) N 
Cod War (fishing rights) Y N N N 
Independence Comoros Y N N N 
Incident at border between colonial French Territory 
and Somalia  Y N N N 
Southern Rhodesian Aggression against Mozambique Y Y Y Y 
China-Vietnam Border Dispute Y N N N 
Teheran Hostage Crisis Y Y (just 1) N 
Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan Y Y N N 
United States Aggression against Libya N N N N 
South African Aggression against Angola Y N N N 
Israeli attack on Iraqi nuclear reactor Y Y N N 
US support for counter-revolutionary insurgents in 
Nicaragua Y Y N N 
Status of Belize N N N N 
Falkland War Y Y (just 1) N 
deployment of neutron bombs in South Korea N N N N 
US intervention in Grenada Y N N N 
situation in Lebanon  (complaint by Syria) N N N N 
21 cases (Y:N) 
15:6 
71% 
9:6 
60% 
2:7 
29% 
1:1 
50% 
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Table B: Disputes from 1990 to 1999 
 
 
Phase 
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US intervention in Panama Y N N N 
forced inspection of Cuban vessel Y N N N 
Iraqi attack on Kuwait Y Y Y (many) Y 
Blockade of ships in Persian Gulf N N N N 
Iraqi repression of civilian population Y Y N N 
no-fly zones in Northern and Southern Iraq N N N N 
harassment of Iranian vessels and air planes N N N N 
US military cooperation with Israel; US pressure 
for regime change in Libya N N N N 
deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia (Croatia’s 
war of secession) Y Y Y (many) Y 
War in Bosnia and Herzegovina Y Y Y (many) Y 
deteriorating situation in Kosovo Y Y Y N 
North Korean nuclear issue Y Y N N 
North Korean missile test N N N N 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict Y Y Y (many) N 
situation in Rwanda (genocide) Y Y Y (many) Y 
threat of intervention in Haiti N N N N 
persistent unrest in Afghanistan N N N N 
Aegean boundary line N N N N 
construction of military fortifications along the 
Green Line Y Y Y (many) N 
Turkish military operations in Northern Iraq N N N N 
nuclear bomb tests by India and Pakistan Y Y N N 
US bombing of chemical factory in Sudan N N N N 
22 cases (Y:N) 
12:10 
55% 
10:2 
83% 
7:3 
70% 
4:3 
57% 
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